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Abstract
“This paper introduces a new task and a new
dataset”, “we improve the state of the art in
X by Y” – it is rare to find a current natural
language processing paper (or AI paper more
generally) that does not contain such state-
ments. What is mostly left implicit, however,
is the assumption that this necessarily consti-
tutes progress, and what it constitutes progress
towards. Here, we make more precise the nor-
mally impressionistically used notions of lan-
guage task and language game and ask how a
research programme built on these might make
progress towards the goal of modelling general
language competence.
1 Introduction
Recently, seemingly ever other natural language
processing paper introduces a new task and a new
dataset.1 We join some other recent papers (e.g.
Yogatama et al., 2019) in asking whether there
is any coherence to this research approach, under
which conditions it can lead to progress, and to-
wards what. What we do differently, however, is
to look at the fundamental assumptions behind this
approach. We try to define central notions, in order
to be able to discuss the structure of the typically
only implicit formulated approach more clearly.
In our argumentation, we distinguish between
language tasks, such as for example “describe
this image”, or “translate this sentence”—that is,
single-step tasks that involve in an essential way
natural language material, but not necessarily only
language material—; micro worlds, which are en-
vironments that produce disinterested responses to
actions, thereby possibly simulating the behaviour
of independently existing systems; and dialogue
1Not quite, but not very far. Looking at the 2018 long
and short paper proceedings of ACL and EMNLP, we get 94
hits for “introduce new dataset”, 20 hits for “introduce new
corpus”, and 101 hits for “introduce new task”.
games as repeated and connected language tasks,
which these environments enable. We define these
notions first and think about general ways of eval-
uating their relevance. We close with some tenta-
tive recommendations for how to connect individ-
ual modelling contributions with the larger enter-
prise of modelling language processing.
2 Tasks, Worlds, and Games
2.1 Tasks
A language task is a mapping between an input
space and an output or action space, at least one
of which contains natural language expressions.2
The mapping has to conform to a task description,
which is typically given only informally, mak-
ing reference to theoretical or pre-theoretical con-
structs external to the definition, such as “transla-
tion” or “is true of”. We call this an intensional
description. Often, a task is also specified exten-
sionally through the provision of a dataset of ex-
amples of the mapping (that is, pairs of state and
action), X = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)}, where the
assumption is that (x, y) ∈ X → y = L(x) (L
being the task mapping).
This very general definition essentially covers
much, if not all of natural language processing.
For example, translation can be seen as a language
task where the state space consists of expressions
in one language, the action space of expressions in
another language, and the task description is that
in each pair in the mapping, the second element
be a translation of the first. We can further dis-
tinguish understanding tasks, where the mapping
requires demonstration of sensitivity to language
meaning (however that is to be further defined); in-
terpretation tasks, where the input space contains
language expressions that are to be “understood”;
2A formal definition of this and the other notions is given
in the Appendix.
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What is the nature of the „involves“ relation between task and capability? In the most trivial case, the capability is „to be able 
to do task T.“ From that, we learn nothing about C_L..  
The strongest relation would be „the task fully specifies the capability“. The task of associating phrase structures to strings 
would be an example of that? The dataset would then be a treebank, and the model would directly be a model of the 
capability. 
 
If you’re interested in the box on the left, you set up tasks that involve capabilities in the same way.. pipeline: parsing, then 
interpretation… 
If you have no interest in that box and only in the box on the right (the model), then what… You leave it to others to probe M 
for the kinds of representations that it learns, and how it structures those? BERTology… 
 
A psycholinguist might be interested in the implementation level.. My claim always has been that this is a computational model 
in the sense that it specifies what must be computed..
Figure 1: The structure of relations between the research objects model, dataset, task, game, environment, cognitive
capability.
generation tasks, where the output does (with a
given task potentially being both an interpretation
and a generation task); reference t sks, where he
understanding is shown by relating linguistic and
non-linguistic material, and inference tasks, where
linguistic material is related.
2.2 Worlds
The language competence of humans plays out in
repeated task, not single-step ones as described
in the previous section, and it plays out in con-
texts where language use is embedded in a non-
linguistic context. To study such repeated, situ-
ated games, much recent work has made use of
environment simulators that compute reactions to
actions performed within them, in accordance to
the assumed (or actual) rules of the domain they
represent.3 Such environments can again be de-
scribed as mappings, in this case from an action to
an environmental response (a state), where again
the mapping conforms to a description of which
real-world counterpart it is intended to model, and
how.4
3See for example (Savva et al., 2019; Adams et al., 2012;
Johnson et al., 2016; Urbanek et al., 2019; Baroni et al.,
2017a; Xia et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2018; Misra et al., 2018;
Coˆte´ et al., 2018; Bennett and Shatkhin, 2018; Anderson
et al., 2018; Savva et al., 2017; Gordon et al., 2017; Brodeur
et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2017; Janarthanam and Lemon,
2011; Baroni et al., 2017b; Byron et al., 2007; Yamauchi
et al., 2013).
4In this desire to model the relevant aspects of a domain,
and in the assumption that from dealing with a simulated
environment transferable knowledge about dealing with the
original enviroment can be achieved, this approach is remi-
niscent of the AI microworlds of the 1970s—“we see solv-
ing a problem often as getting to know one’s way around a
2.3 Games
An interaction game s a set ing where players
can produce actions (a special kind of which can
be messages), possibly regulated by some regime
on when they can do this and who can observe
them. A priviledged, but disinterested player Na-
ture can respond to those actions, by providing
game-relevant information (and interfacing with
the environment in which the game is embedded).
Again, we assume that there is an informal game
description which specifies which, if any, other-
wise existing activity the game is meant to model.
A language game is an interaction game that em-
beds language tasks which govern the actions of
the players. For example, one player asking and
the other player answering questions would be a
language game that poses repeated language tasks
to the players.
Summarising this section, Figure 1 shows the
structure of relations between the notions intro-
duced here: Models relate to Tasks, via Datasets,
Games are realised in Environments. Capabilities
will be discussed below.
3 What makes a good task, world, game?
Let’s now assume we encounter a paper that pro-
poses a new dataset, language task, microworld, or
language game. How can we evaluate the contri-
bution that is made?
‘micro-world’ in which the problem exists.” (Minsky and
Papert, 1972)—and perhaps susceptible to similar kinds of
critiques as these attempts (Dreyfus, 1981; Marr, 1982).
3.1 Tasks
... and datasets As mentioned, tasks are often
exemplified by the provision of a dataset of ex-
amples of the task being executed by agents that
are assumed to be capable of doing so—typically,
human participants in experiments or data collec-
tion efforts. Evaluating such datasets in itself is
relatively straightforward. First, it should be ver-
ified, which is to check whether the provided in-
put/output pairs can indeed be judged correct rel-
ative to the task (in its intensional description). If
the examples are collected specifically for the pur-
pose of exemplifying the task, this is the process
of controlling annotation, and standard method-
ologies exists (Artstein and Poesio, 2008).
Validating a dataset is a less formalised process.
It comprises arguing that the dataset indeed exem-
plifies the task intension well. For example, pairs
only of images of giraffes and sentences describ-
ing them would arguably not exemplify the gen-
eral task of image description very well (even if
the descriptions are accurate), while perhaps ex-
emplifying the task of giraffe image description.
Another way to evaluate datasets is by provid-
ing a model of the task learned on parts of it,
and testing it on the remaining part (for which a
comparison, or loss, function on input/output pairs
must be provided as well). If a model can “solve”
the dataset even when not given information that
for theoretical or pre-theoretical reasons is seen to
be crucial, the dataset can be considered an un-
satisfactory exemplification of the task. E.g., in
a visual (polar) question answering setting (Antol
et al., 2015), if in a dataset all and only the expres-
sions that mention giraffes are true, a model would
not need to take the images into account at all to
perform well (as it would just need to detect the
presence of giraffe-related words), which would
be evidence that the dataset is deficient relative to
the task description.
... in themselves How can a task in itself be mo-
tivated and evaluated? This is easy, if it has a direct
value to a consumer (such as translation presum-
ably has), which can be measured. If the consumer
is a computer system that processes the output of
the task further, the burden of evaluation is sim-
ply shifted to the system as a whole. If the inter-
est is in replicating with a theoretically motivated
model performance characteristics of humans at-
tempting the task, the task can be evaluated for its
power helping distinguish between different mod-
elling choices.
A recent trend, however, has been to motivate
tasks in a different way, neither via their inher-
ent practical use, nor as answering questions about
language processing as implemented in humans.
The argument roughly goes as follows (even if typ-
ically only made implicitly): To be good at task
T , an agent must possess a set CT of capabilities
(of representational or computational nature). If
the c ∈ CT are capabilities that competent lan-
guage users can be shown or argued to possess and
make use of in using language—let’s call the set
of these capabilities of a competent language user
CL, so that CT ⊆ CL— then being able to model
these capabilities (via modelling the task) results
in progress towards the ultimate goal, which is to
model competent language use. And hence, any
task T that comes with an interesting set CT is a
good task.5
Under what conditions does this argument
work? First of all, the assumed connection to the
set of capability must indeed be there. We have
already seen a way to challenge a claimed con-
nection, namely through providing a model that
can “solve” a given task (via a dataset) while not
having access to information that should be in-
volved in the capability. (Although this challenge
5To give some examples of informal versions of this ar-
gument, and chosing papers more or less randomly, here are
some quotes (typically from the introduction sections of their
respective papers):
From the paper that introduced the visual question answer-
ing task (Antol et al., 2015): “What makes for a compelling
AI-complete task? We believe that in order to spawn the next
generation of AI algorithms, an ideal task should (i) require
multi-modal knowledge beyond a single sub-domain (such as
CV) and (ii) have a well-defined quantitative evaluation met-
ric to track progress. [. . . ] Open-ended questions require a
potentially vast set of AI capabilities to answer – fine-grained
recognition (e.g., What kind of cheese is on the pizza?), ob-
ject detection (e.g., How many bikes are there?), activity
recognition (e.g., Is this man crying?), knowledge based rea-
soning (e.g., Is this a vegetarian pizza?), and commonsense
reasoning (e.g., Does this person have 20/20 vision?, Is this
person expecting company?).”
About the natural language inference problem, and at-
tempting at least an implicit structuring of the space of ca-
pabilities, Condoravdi et al. (2003) write: “The ability to rec-
ognize such semantic relations is clearly not a sufficient cri-
terion for language understanding: there is more to language
understanding than just being able to tell that one sentence
follows from another. But we would argue that it is a mini-
mal, necessary criterion.”
Williams et al. (2018), on the modern version of this task:
“The task of natural language inference (NLI) is well posi-
tioned to serve as a benchmark task for research on NLU.
[. . . ] In particular, a model must handle phenomena like
lexical entailment, quantification, coreference, tense, belief,
modality, and lexical and syntactic ambiguity.”
in the first instance only targets the dataset and not
the task itself.) Secondly, following usual scien-
tific methodology (Popper, 1934), we can rank the
worth of an instantiation of this argument by how
precisely the capability is specified, from the triv-
ially correct “task T involves the capability to do
task T” to a statement that could be wrong (and
hence involves other theoretical constructs), e.g.
“task T involves the capability to compute the syn-
tactic structure of a natural language sentence”.
Furthermore, we can rank the motivation given
for a task by how explicit it is in delineating the set
of capabilities it involves, along two dimensions.
In the one dimension (separability), in the most
extreme form, the claim would be that the set of
capabilities CT is fully separated from CL \ CT ,
and hence there is no danger of overfitting solu-
tions to CT in such a way as would be detrimental
for the remaining capabilities.6 In the other di-
mension (exhaustivity), the strongest claim would
be that T brings out all there is to c ∈ CT , and that
another task T ′, insofar as it requires c as well,
could be handled by a model of c built with only
T in mind. In the other extreme, we only have
“c as required by T ”, which does less to indicate
progress beyond T .
As this discussion suggests, it seems difficult to
properly motivate a task without relying, at least
implicitly, on assumptions about how CL decom-
poses.
3.2 Worlds
We have introduced “worlds” (or environments, or
simulators) above as the settings that enable re-
peated tasks (games), and in parts their evaluation
is connected to those. However, as the providers
of inputs to a task in reaction to its outputs, where
this mapping must also confirm to a description,
we can also evaluate them qua environment.
First, the notions of validation and verification
apply as well: An environment should match, as
well as possible, its stated description of its re-
lation to a real-world counterpart, and should be
verified to be correct according to its specifica-
tion. Environments like those needed for games
like Chess and Go (e.g. Silver et al., 2017), or Set-
tlers of Catan (e.g. Afantenos et al., 2012), can
fully model their intended real-world counterpart,
whereas others can only be modelled aproximately
6That is, unless the claim is that CT = CL; the use of
“AI-complete” in the quote above from Antol et al. (2015)
suggest that is something that not everyone shies away from.
(e.g., “the interior of a house, through which an
agent moves, from the perspective of that agent”
— as the body of the agent and the agent’s aware-
ness of it, arguably, is a part of the environment,
this would entail modelling this as well).
A detailed list of desiderata for such “artifi-
cial general intelligence” environments is given
by Adams et al. (2012) (see also Baroni et al.
(2017b)): “C1. The environment is complex, with
diverse, interacting and richly structured objects.
C2. The environment is dynamic and open. C3.
Task-relevant regularities exist at multiple time
scales. C4. Other agents impact performance. C5.
Tasks can be complex, diverse and novel. C6. In-
teractions between agent, environment and tasks
are complex and limited. C7. Computational re-
sources of the agent are limited. C8. Agent exis-
tence is long-term and continual.” While this list
mixes what we separate as demands on environ-
ments and on games set in them, it should be use-
ful to evaluate proposed environments.
In analogy to what we observed for tasks, it
seems that trying to make progress through mod-
elling tasks in simulated worlds entails making an-
other separability hypothesis, which assumes that
the natural competence of handling the world as a
whole is separable into handling various parts of it,
which can be “knit” together to form the whole.7
3.3 Games
What makes for an interesting language game?
First we note that games seem to be less well ex-
emplified by datasets than (non-game) tasks are, as
for them the relation between an input and an out-
put is much less constrained, and the output can be
a sequence of actions rather than a simple one. To
give an example, in the language-navigation task
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2019), while
the input is a single datum (a verbal description of
a goal location), the output is a sequence of navi-
gation actions.8
As the site for repeated and connected language
7“[W]e feel [the micro-worlds] are so important that we
plan to assign a large portion of our effort to developing a col-
lection of these micro-worlds and finding how to embed their
suggestive and predictive powers in larger systems without
being misled by their incompatibility with literal truth. [. . . ]
In order to study such problems, we would like to have collec-
tions of knowledge for several ‘micro-worlds’, ultimately to
learn how to knit them together.” (Minsky and Papert, 1972).
8On the role of environments/games vis-a`-vis datasets,
Savva et al. (2019) state their belief that “simulators will as-
sume the role played previously by datasets”; no further ar-
gumentation is given to support this belief, however.
tasks, we can evaluate a game again for how it
connects to language capabilities, and for how the
game setting improves over a (non-repeated) task
setting. For example, some previous work has
shown that language production under (interac-
tive) task constraints is different from null-context
language production (Ilinykh et al., 2018; da Silva
Rocha and Paraboni, 2016).
Finally, it seems that for language games there
is a natural supremum, which would be “unre-
stricted situated language interaction”. We can
then also evaluate proposed tasks for how close
they come to this ultimate form, for some defini-
tion of “closeness”.
4 Making Progress
U¨berhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an
sich, daß er viel gro¨ßer ausschaut als
er wirklich ist. (It is in the nature of
progress that it appears much greater
than it actually is.) NESTROY, via
Wittgenstein (1953/84)
Research is an incremental enterprise, and new
tasks, datasets, models, environments, and games
are introduced in a context of existing ones. We
can now distinguish several modes of making
progress in the general project, by relating new
proposals to existing ones.
4.1 Better Models
This is the mode of progress for most of the cur-
rent work in NLP / AI, and it is also the one that
needs the least argumentative support: If a model
trained on a given dataset performs better, in terms
of the same pre-defined metrics, than a previous
model, then progress has been made. Or would
that it were so simple: Even in this setting, con-
siderations of computing power spent should ar-
guably also factor, and how to account for use of
larger datasets (for example in pre-training), when
judging models that achieve better results.9 And
ultimately, the worth of progress in modelling a
particular task rests only on the worth of the task
itself.
A different way in which models can improve
over others is in how well they are suited for trans-
fer to other tasks (see Ruder (2019) for a recent
overview of such transfer-learning).
9See e.g. the recent discussion on https://
hackingsemantics.xyz/2019/leaderboards/.
4.2 Better Datasets
We have discussed the relation between tasks and
datasets above. If a dataset can be shown to be
successfully modelled even in the absence of in-
formation that is deemed criticially involved in the
capability of interest, it can be considered invalid
relative to the task description, and, if the interest
in the task is kept, a new dataset must be found.
The task of visual question answering provides
an interesting example case of such a develop-
ment. After Antol et al. (2015) introduced the first
large scale dataset for this task, it quickly became
clear that this dataset could be handled competi-
tively by models that were deprived of visual in-
put (“language bias”, as noted e.g. by Jabri et al.,
2016). This problem was then addressed by Goyal
et al. (2017) with the construction of a less biased
(and hence more valid) corpus. Targetting the set
of capabilities involved in the task, Andreas et al.
(2016) noted that “questions in most existing nat-
ural image datasets are quite simple, for the most
part requiring that only one or two pieces of infor-
mation be extracted from an image in order to an-
swer it successfully”, which makes it not challeng-
ing enough in terms of “[c]ompositionality, and
the corresponding ability to answer questions with
arbitrarily complex structure”. To improve on that,
they introduced the SHAPES dataset which pairs
synthetic images with synthetic, programmatically
generated sentences that contain spatial relations.
Two more datasets explored this direction (John-
son et al., 2017; Suhr et al., 2017), until another
dataset (Suhr et al., 2018) progressed beyond the
use of synthetic images, in effect claiming that nat-
ural images are more valid for the task described
as “visual question answering”.
4.3 Better Tasks and Games
We see a movement towards involvement of ca-
pabilities already in the previous two sections.
Where a model can be judged to be better than an-
other one (trained on the same data) simply by the
linear order imposed by the evaluation metric, a
dataset must be argued to be more representative
of a task by taking recourse to the capabilities of
interest (e.g., in the example discussed just above,
that of handling compositionality).
As shown in Figure 1, tasks are only grounded
(to their left in the diagram) by capabilities (and
games by tasks), and hence an argumentation for
a task T ′ in relation to a previous task T should
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Figure 2: Three ways of making progress: improving models, improving datasets, improving tasks. (Not shown:
devising models that handle more than one dataset.)
ideally make mention of how CT ′ and CT relate.
(Similarly for games.)
Figure 2 again summarises this discussion in a di-
agramm.
4.4 From Models to Capabilities
An interesting additional avenue of research has
been explored in recent years (see for example the
paper by Hewitt and Manning, 2019, and refer-
ences therein), where models trained on datasets
(representing tasks or games) are explored for how
they decomposed their (representational) task. For
example, the question might be, as in the cited pa-
per, whether a particular model trained on a par-
ticular task creates “internally” something akin to
syntax trees. Again, why this might be interesting
is typically not spelled out in these papers, but one
can assume that the intended underlying argument
goes something like this: “If the theoretical con-
struct is to be found, this shows that postulating
it is empirically validated (and it can be learned
simply through exposure to data); if it is not there,
then the task can be done without it, to the extent
that the model can do it, and it need not be postu-
lated”.
5 Conclusions: Making it Explicit
The discussion above has mixed normative (how
it could, or should be) and descriptive (how it is)
aspects. I will close by commenting more directly
on what I think could be improved.
As discussed above, the most frequent way of
contributing to the project is by improving mod-
els, for which established methods of evaluation
exist. Next frequent is providing new or improved
datasets. Here already we find a much larger
variety of how the contribution is motivated and
framed, and often it is taken as self-evident that a
new dataset will drive progress. Here, more ex-
plicitness about the assumed advantages, and how
they connect to the goal of modelling language
competence, would be helpful.10
This holds even more when introducing new
tasks or games. As the discussion above hopefully
has made plausible, motivating those in them-
selves, and relating them to existing ones, requires
making claims about language capabilities. To
make these in a convincing way, it seems advan-
tageous to strive for a renewed, stronger connec-
tion to the sciences that study them: linguistics
and cognitive psychology. Those fields provide
the theoretical terms and constructs that would al-
low us to make the, as discussed above, typically
implicit arguments more explicit (and hence con-
testable).
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A Formalising the Notions
A.1 Tasks
Definition 1 A Language Task is a tuple
(S,A,L, DT ), where:
• S is a (possibly infinite) set of states,
• A is a (possibly infinite) set of actions,
• with either the states in S or the actions in
A (or both) having as part natural language
expressions, and
• L : S → A is a function that maps a state
s ∈ S to an action a ∈ A, where
• the mapping L conforms to task description
DT .
A.2 Worlds
Definition 2 A Micro-World or Environment is a
tuple (S,A, E , R,DW ), where function E : S ×
A→ S×R maps an action a, taken in state s, to a
state s′ and a reward r, and the mapping conforms
to the world description DW .
A.3 Games
We approach the definition of a language game via
the more general notion of interaction game:11
Definition 3 An Interaction Game is a tuple
(P,A, o, T,E,DG), where:
• P = {p1, . . . , pn, N} is the set of n regular
players p, together with one additional player
N (for Nature).
N has a special status in that it does not
have a strategic interest in the outcome of the
game.
• A = {A1, . . . , An, AN} is the set of action
spaces, with one space per player.
Action types can be complex: e.g.,
(nav, s), for “navigation action, south”,
or (utt, “I don’t know”) for “utterance of
I don’t know”. If defined in the right way
(for example by a recursive grammar), the
set of action types can be infinite. Players
chose actions from their space of available
actions; the resulting action tokens aj are
associated with their originator through a
11Pace Wittgenstein (1953/84), we get to define what a
game is. Or we could go with Suits (1978), who is happy
to define games as rule-guided activities of voluntary attempt
to overcome unnecessary obstacles. His concepts of prelu-
sory goal, which can be stated independently of the game
(e.g., in football (soccer), “make the ball be in the opponent
team’s goal”); constitutive rules, which make reaching that
goal more difficult than necessary (e.g., by disallowing to
just grab the ball and carry it to the goal); and lusory atti-
tude, which is to accept the complications posed by the con-
stitutive rules, can inform the design of games that work via
crowdsourcing.
function a : Ai → P , and with a position in
the sequence of actions that have been per-
formed since the beginning of the interaction
through a function t : Ai → N.
• o : Pi × Ai → P(P ) (for Pi ∈ P,Ai ∈
A) is the observability function that specifies
which types of actions by which player can be
observed by which subset of the players.
In normal cases, one would assume that play-
ers can observe their own actions, and that
Nature observes all actions; but this allows
for the specification of deviant cases.
• T : ∅ ∪ (P × A) → P(P ) is the turn taking
rule that specifies who can act next, depend-
ing on who did what last. It also specifies
who can start the game.
In a free initiative setting, any player can act
at any time; in a strict turn based setting,
the current player would always be excluded
from the set of next players.
• E : S → V is the evaluation rule that maps a
sequence of action tokens 〈a1, . . . , am〉 into
an evaluation, where the set of possible eval-
uations V includes at least one positive one
(e.g., success) and one negative one (e.g.,
failure).
The evaluation is made known to the players
when a positive or negative outcome has been
reached. If it is not, or if it is does not contain
outcomes denoted as positive or negative, we
call the resulting structure an interaction set-
ting, rather than an interaction game.
• DG finally is the game description which
specifies which, if any, otherwise existing ac-
tivity the game is meant to approximate.
The well-known Gridworld game (see e.g. Sut-
ton and Barto (1998)) for example can be repre-
sented in these terms as being an interaction game
with one regular player (the agent) interacting with
Nature, P = {p1, N}. The agent can only per-
form navigation actions: A1 = {(nav,n), . . . },
Nature informs on the resulting available naviga-
tion options, AN = {(inform, (n,w)), . . . }, with
the information that Nature relays coming from a
microworld that simulates the grid and the move-
ment on it.
Gridworld does not involve language, and
hence is not an example of a language interaction
game. As an example of a language interaction
setting that is not a game, we can define free chat
interaction in our terms as involving two players
and an inert Nature that does not intervene: P =
{p1, p2, N}, A1 = A2 = {(utt, α)}, AN = ∅, T
is a constant function into P (free initiative), all
actions are observed by all, E is a constant func-
tion into {undecided}.
